Distributed optimization is a fundamental mathematical theory for parallel and distributed systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
Several real-world optimization problems involve parties or nodes interacting via some networks that must collaborate to solve an optimization problem for mutual benefit [1] , [2] . For example, in the business sector, independent companies need to interact for completing a common business and thus have to work together to optimize their joint operations. Normally, optimization solvers require much public data sharing among the parties, which may substantially hinder or prevent the cooperation for optimization due to privacy concerns. The fundamental question is how to solve optimization problems among parties that would receive much benefit by collaboration and yet are unwilling to share their data without preserving privacy.
Cryptography is the standard approach to preserve privacy in distributed optimization solvers [3] .
However, cryptography may introduce substantial overhead among the nodes due to the exchange of security information and coordination. Cryptography is prone to attack by third parties who may inadvertently own the cryptographic keys. Moreover, for large networks, namely for networks with a large number of parties, it might be prohibitive if not impossible to use cryptography. Therefore, it is highly desirable to have distributed solution algorithms without introducing extra coordination or overhead and that naturally preserve privacy in the transactions.
The availability of these distributed solution algorithms posses many appealing merits, which are desirable in practice, e.g., efficiency, scalability, natural (geographical) distribution of problem data. More importantly, they are per-se privacy preserving without requiring any extra coordination or overhead. In this paper, we propose a systematic study of methods ensuring both the efficient solution of distributed optimization problems and the privacy of the associate transactions. We further motivate the need of such a theory by some simple illustrative examples.
A. Motivating examples
Here, we present some real-world examples that motivate and highlight the strong need of a per se privacy preserving optimization theory.
Example 1 (Privacy preserving data mining [4] ): Suppose that there are two different government agencies, a local Agency 1 and a nation-wide Agency 2 that store their information at their databases. The general goal is that both agencies have to collaborate and provide a joint classification of possible security threats. The survey and generalize in this paper, and potential decomposition based approaches, which we investigate substantially in this paper.
Cryptographic primitives include secure multiparty computations [6] , pseudo random generator [7] , [8] , homomorphic encryption [9] , [10] , [11] . These methods use cryptographic tools such as zero-knowledge [12] , oblivious transfer [13] , 1-out-of-n oblivious transfer [14] , oblivious evaluation of polynomials [15] , secret sharing [16] , and threshold cryptography [17] . In general, the area of cryptography-based privacy preserving optimization is very well investigated [3] , [18] - [21] . In the context of optimization problems, cryptographic tools are used for securely perform iterations of well known simplex algorithm and interior-point algorithm so that the sensitive data is not disclosed during the methods, see [22] - [24] for secure simplex variants and [5] for secure variants of interior-point method. In terms of security, those cryptographic methods are highly desirable, though they are highly unfavorable in terms of computational complexity and efficiency [5] .
Developing solution methods based on algebraic transformations that preserve privacy of data without cryptography has attracted the interest of the research community [4] - [6] , [25] - [31] . We refer to those approaches as transformation methods in general. The key idea of these is to use algebraic manipulations to disguise the original problem into an equivalent problem so that the private data of each node is hidden. However, in these interesting papers, only some specific problems have been considered and there is not any attempt to establish a systematic approach. We strongly believe that the transformation based privacy preserving approaches still need to be systematically investigated. Moreover, decomposition methods [1] , [32] , and state-of-the-art distributed optimization methods, such as alternating direction method of multipliers (ADMM) [33] are less investigated in the context of privacy preserving problem solution methods. However, these approaches posses inherent privacy preserving properties, and therefore have a huge potential to handle privacy issues in a more efficient manner.
Given the drawbacks of cryptographic approaches, investigating efficient and scalable methods that are per-se privacy preserving is of crucial importance from a theoretical, as well as from a practical perspective. Therefore, in this paper, we place a greater emphasis on transfor-mation methods and optimization approaches, such as decomposition methods and ADMM methods that posses inherent privacy preserving characteristics, as opposed to treatments based on well investigated cryptographic primitives. Of course, there are many papers that describe in details cryptographic methods and are extraneous to the main focus of this paper (see, e.g., [3] ). In particular, we summarize the existing privacy preserving solution methods based on transformation approaches by a more generic canonical form. Then, we discuss in detail a general decomposition structure together with classical decomposition techniques, including primal decomposition and dual decomposition, as well as state-of-the-art method ADMM. Their inherent privacy preserving properties are investigated. The importance of these per-se privacy preserving methods is highlighted through a number of examples and their performance is compared in terms of efficiency, scalability, complexity and many others. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that provides a general classification and comparison of per-se privacy-preserving methods in optimization, and introduces the inherent privacy properties of decomposition methods.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In § II we present some basic definitions that are useful for describing the properties of privacy preserving optimization. A general formulation to model the existing privacy preserving techniques is presented in § III. Optimization approaches, such as decomposition, ADMM methods in the context of privacy preserving optimization are extensively discussed in § III and V. In § VI, we provide a summary, including comparisons of different methods for privacy preserving and future directions. Conclusions are given in § VII.
Notations: Boldface lower case and upper case letters represent vectors and matrices respectively and calligraphy letters represent sets. The set of real n-vectors is denoted IR n , and the set of real m × n matrices is denoted IR m×n . The identity matrix is denoted by I. The superscript (·) T stands for transpose. Vectors and matrices are delimited with square brackets, with the components separated by space. The ith submatrix of a matrix is usually denoted by using a subscript. We use parentheses to construct column vectors from comma separated lists, e.g.,
We denote by ||x|| 1 the ℓ 1 -norm and by ||x|| 2 ℓ 2 -norm of the vector x.
II. PER-SE PRIVACY PRESERVING DEFINITIONS
Many standard privacy/security conventional definitions are already adopted in cryptographic literature; see for example [6] , [34] - [38] . However, such definitions are not directly applied or adopted in the context of transformation based and decomposition based optimization methods.
This is because the key mechanisms used for preserving the privacy in cryptographic protocols are entirely different from those that are to be used in optimization based approaches. Theoretical foundations for defining the privacy of optimization methods deserve attention in its own right.
However, to highlight the appealing privacy preserving properties associated with optimization based approaches, and to provide a cohesive discussion, we give here some basic definitions.
Definition 1 (Optimization problem):
We consider the following standard notation to describe the problem of finding a point x that minimizes the function f 0 (x) subject to a number of inequality and equality constraints:
We call (1), an optimization problem. Here f 0 : IR n → IR is called the objective function, f i (x) ≤ 0, i = 1, . . . , q are called inequality constraints with the associated inequality constraint functions 
Definition 2 (convex problem):
A convex optimization problem is a one of the same form as (1) provided some assumptions hold. In particular, the convex problem is 
Here, the objective function f 0 and the optimization variable x is spread out among K-parties, such that c i and x i are owned by party i.
Definition 4 (Semi-honest adversary):
In a multi-party environment, an entity involved in solving a global optimization problem of the form (1), centrally or in a coordinated fashion with other entities, is called a semi-honest adversary, if it executes its prescribed computations correctly, but keeps a record of all information it receives from other parties and tries to learn properties of others' private data.
The definition above is inspired form [40] and is similar to the good and the passive adversary models given in [41] and [42] , respectively. In a multi-party environment, there can be more than one adversaries. We consider the semi-honest adversary model throughout this paper.
Definition 5 (Inputs and outputs of a convex problem):
Consider the convex problem (2) . We call the set of problem parameters, the terms C, d, those ones required to define the functions f 0 , f i and/or C, d together with the functions themselves as inputs of problem (2) . Moreover, we call the solution and the optimal value of problem (2) as outputs. 
Definition 6 (Input privacy):
We say that the mechanism for solving an optimization problem yields input privacy for a subset C of the input if during the solution method stages, only a transformed variant of the original objects in C is available to the adversary and such that recovering the original C is impossible without the knowledge of the transformation. Moreover, we say that the solution method for an optimization problem yields input privacy for C also if C is unknown to the adversary. minimizeĉ T x subject toÂx ≤b
where the variable is x. Problem (3) and (4) and for Bob's data {A, b} because without knowing β, Alice cannot recover Bob's data {A, b}, by using {Â,b}., and in addition, without knowing α, Bob cannot recover Alice's data c, by usingĉ.
Definition 7 (Output Privacy):
We say that the mechanism for solving an optimization problem yields output privacy for a subset X of the output if at the end, only a transformed variant of X is available to the adversary such that recovering the original X is impossible without knowing the transformation. Moreover, we say that the solution method for an optimization problem yields output privacy also if X is unknown to the adversary at the end.
More examples will be discussed in § III and § IV. We emphasize that investigating a comprehensive treatment of a set of mathematical definitions is out of the scope of this paper. We believe that the basic definitions (4)- (7) given above are sufficient for surveying the appealing aspects and properties of privacy preserving optimization approaches presented in this paper.
III. TRANSFORMATION BASED METHODS FOR PRIVACY PRESERVING
In this section, existing transformation based methods proposed for privacy preserving linear
, [28] , [31] , [44] , as well as nonlinear programming [45] , [46] are considered. The number of parties involved in a problem can be either two [5] , [25] , [30] , [31] , [43] , [44] or more [26] - [28] , [45] , [46] . In the sequel, we provide a generic description for such privacy preserving solution methods proposed in the literature.
Transformation method is directly based on the notion of equivalence of optimization problems [39, § 4.1.3]. Two problems are called to be equivalent if, from a solution of one, a solution of the other is readily derived. There are many general transformations that yield equivalent problems. We next propose two transformations, which captures all the problem formulations in [5] , [25] - [28] , [30] , [31] , [43] - [46] .
A. Transformation via Change of Variable
Suppose the original problem to be solved in a privacy preserving manner is given by (2) . We denote by D the set of points for which the objective and all constraint functions are defined, or
image covering the problem domain D. Now we perform the following change of variables:
The resulting problem is given by minimize f 0 (ϕ(z))
where the variables are z ∈ IR m . It follows that if x solves problem (2), then z = ϕ −1 (x) solves problem (6). Moreover, if z solves problem (6) , then x = ϕ(z) solves problem (2) . Thus, the two problems are equivalent. Such a transformation is used to ensure privacy, as we see next.
Privacy Properties
If the function ϕ is chosen appropriately, then any solution method applied to the transformed problem (via change of variables) can yield the input privacy for many inputs (except for d) via the function compositionŝ
The output privacy for the optimal solution is attained by the definition of ϕ (see (5)). In the sequel, we highlight these privacy properties by using some examples. First, lets see some choices for the function ϕ.
Example 6:
• xxx
• Scaling: Here, we simply use the change of variable x = ϕ(z) = az, where a is a scalar.
• Translation: Here, we use the following change of variable, x = ϕ(z) = z + a, where a ∈ IR n .
• Affine transformation: This is a generalization of both scaling and translation. Specifically, we use the following change of variable, x = ϕ(z) = Bz + a, where B ∈ IR n×m is a full rank matrix with rank(B) = n and a ∈ IR n . Thus, a particular inverse transformation ϕ −1 : IR n → IR m is given by
where
, which is typically known as pseudo-inverse or Moore-Penrose inverse.
• Nonlinear transformations: One example is as follows,
We see that all the approaches [5] , [25] - [27] , [30] , [31] , [43] - [46] have used change of variables (affine transformations) as one of the mechanism for privacy preserving in their proposed solution methods. To illustrate this, we consider few key examples from the literature. 
where the variable is x ∈ IR n and the problem data are c ∈ IR n , A ∈ IR m×n with m < n, nonsingular B ∈ IR n×n , and b ∈ IR m . The customer does not want to reveal problem data c, A, b, B and the solution x ⋆ of the problem to the cloud, i.e., input privacy for {c, A, b, B} and output privacy for x ⋆ is the requirement.
The cloud customer then uses the affine transformation [44, § III-C]
where M ∈ IR n×n is a nonsingular matrix and r ∈ IR n is a vector, both known by the customer only. The equivalent problem outsourced by the customer to the cloud is given by minimizeĉ T z subject toÂz =b
where the variable is z ∈ IR m and the problem input isĉ = M T c,Â = MA,b = b + Ar, andB = MB.
The cloud computes the optimal solution of problem (8), which we denote by z ⋆ .
The sensitive inputs of problem (7), {c, A, b, B}, cannot be recovered by a potential adversary or the cloud because the matrix M and the column vector r are not known to the cloud. For the same reasons, the cloud cannot construct the sensitive output x ⋆ by using z ⋆ . Thus, the solution procedure yields both input privacy and output privacy.
The problem data (input) structure can be exploited so that change of variables can be applied to develop privacy preserving solution methods in multi-party environments [26] , [27] , [45] , [46] .
Example 8 (Classification, a multi-party situation [46] ): Consider the following problem:
where the variables are x ∈ IR n , v ∈ IR m , and u ∈ IR. Here the problem parameters
with d i ∈ {−1, +1} is known as class matrix, A ∈ IR m×n is the feature matrix [45] , andB ∈ IRm ×n . The goal is to find the public linear classifier given by (
is the solution of problem (9) . Suppose A and x are partitioned as follows:
Here we have q entities and each submatrix A i is owned by ith entity. The ith entity does not want to reveal its problem data A i and the solution x minimize
with the variables are z ∈ IRExample 9 (Nonlinear transformation, a 2-party situation): Alice wants to outsource to an untrusted party the problem minimize
where the variable is x. Here, the problem data are α i > 0, β i > 0, and γ > 0. Suppose Alice wants input privacy for problem data {α i , β i } i=1,...,n , γ. By using the nonlinear change of variable given in Example 6,
Next Alice can obtain the equivalent problem:
where the variable is z = (z 1 , . . . , z n ) and problem parameter λ i = (β i α 2 i /γ). Now Alice can outsource problem (12) to the untrusted party. We can see that this solution procedure clearly yields input privacy for
is the solution of problem (12) .
B. Transformation of Objective and Constraint Functions
Let the original problem to be solved in a privacy preserving manner be given by (2) . Suppose The equivalent problem is clearly given by
where the variable is x ∈ IR n . The optimal solution of problem (13) is identical to that of problem (2) . The optimal value of problem (2), p ⋆ , and that of problem (13), q ⋆ , are related by
Privacy Properties
With carefully chosen functions ψ i , and ψ, any solution method for solving the transformed problem would yield input privacy for the input of problem (2) via the function compositions
Note that the optimal value p ⋆ is not available to a potential adversary, though the optimal solution is. As a result, output privacy is attained for the optimal value, see (14) . In the sequel, we give some examples to highlight these ideas.
Example 10 (Scaling):
This idea is already presented in Example 5. Scaling is used in part to develop privacy preserving solution methods in references such as [5] , [25] , [30] , [31] , [43] , [44] . Generally speaking, here all the functions ψ i , i = 0, . . . , q and ψ are linear (see (13)), i.e.,
where 
where the variable is x ∈ IR n and the problem data A ∈ IR m×n with rank(A) = n and b ∈ IR m .
Suppose A and b are partitioned as follows:
where The idea is to simply use this objective transformation ψ 0 (z) = z 2 , to yield
and to let the cloud solve the resulting equivalent problem above. Clearly, we have
Thus, the problem can be outsourced by simply each entity i making public only the products of matrices
Note that nobody can construct the sensitive inputs of entity i {A i , b i } by knowing the public matrix products mentioned above. This means that the solution method for solving problem (16) yields input privacy for
Example 12 (Horizontally Partitioned Linear Programs, a multi-party situation [28] ): The method proposed by the authors in [28] is built on the following equality constraint transformation:
where the B ∈ IR m×p with m ≥ p and rank(B) = p. Thus, the following equivalence holds:
where A ∈ IR p×n and b ∈ IR p . We can easily show (18) 
IV. PRIVACY PRESERVING IN DECOMPOSITION METHODS
In this section, we highlight important aspects of decomposition methods for designing privacy preserving solution algorithms. Although these techniques have been heavily used in the context of parallel and distributed optimization (see [1] , [32] , [33] , [47] , [48] and the references therein), we remark that they have not been investigated in the context of privacy preserving optimization.
There are appealing intrinsic privacy preserving properties of these methods, as opposed to extrinsically acquired privacy in transformation based methods (see § III) and cryptographic methods. In the sequel, we present concisely the theory associated with the classical techniques of primal and dual decomposition [1] , [32] . Moreover, we highlight their use in privacy preserving optimization by a number of examples. Note that the solution methods based on decomposition relies heavily on the problem structure. Key techniques such as introduction of new variables, duality (see [39, § 4] ) are often useful in such situations to facilitate decomposition as we will see in the sequel. • y1 = a1, y2 = (b1, b2, b3), y3 = (c1, c2, c3)
A. Primal Decomposition
• p = 7, y = (y1, y2, y3) = (a1, b1, b2, b3, c1, c2, c3) ∈ IR
7
• coupling: net 1 (z1): a1 = b1 = c1 , net 2 (z2): b2 = c2 , net 3 (z3): b3 = c3
The entities are coupled through public variables that require various scalar components of those to be equal. Such coupling or complications can be graphically shown by adding a hyper edge (or a net) that connects the entities for any scalar equality constraint among them. Let N be the number of nets in the system and z = (z 1 , . . . , z N ) ∈ IR N be the common values of the public variables on the nets. For instance, the decomposition structure shown in Table I has 3 nets and z = (z 1 , z 2 , z 3 ). We denote by y ∈ IR p the concatenated public vectors, where y = (y 1 , . . . , y K ) and p = ∑ K i=1 p i is the total number of scalar public variables (see Table I ). By this notation, we let y = Ez, where
We introduce a partition of E as
where E i ∈ IR p i ×N denotes the block of E associated with the entity i, so that y i = E i z. The problem we consider is of the form
where the variables are {(x i , y i )} i=1,...,K and z and Z is a publicly known convex set that enforces other potential constraints on public variables {y i } i=1,...,K . We refer z as net variables.
Primal decomposition techniques allows us to solve the global problem (20) by coordinating
K subproblems, namely one for each entity. Specifically, each entity i can solve his subproblem, which consists of his own private inputs/outputs (e.g., f i , C i , x i ) together with the public variables y i . The coordination performed via some message exchanges among neighbors. It is interesting to note that, though these messages are dependent on problem input, they are often intrinsically privacy preserving. In other words, the exchanged messages can be such that the input {f i , C i } and output {x i } of entity i is not revealed to other entities j ̸ = i. To see this, let us first focus to the derivation of the solution method, where we give a concise discussion.
Algorithm Development
If we fix the net variables z (thus, public variables y i = E i z is fixed), then problem (20) becomes separable into K subproblems and subproblem for entity i is given by
where the variable is x i . We denote by ϕ(y i ) the optimal value of problem (21) . Now note that the original problem (20) is equivalent to the following, which we refer to as the master problem
where the variable is z. The coordination among the entities resides in the method that is used to solve the master problem (22) . Projected subgradient method is a well known algorithm for such a solution, see [1] , [49] for details. In particular, when applying projected subgradient method to solve problem (22) , it is required to compute a subgradient 2 of ϕ at a specified z. One such specific subgradient is
where h i (y i ) ∈ IR p i is a subgradient of ϕ i at y i . This subgradient is obtained for free after solving the subproblem (21) . Note that h i is the message, entity i should send to his neighboring entities.
The main algorithm is as follows:
us give now some examples to convey these appealing aspects.
Example 13 (Quadratic minimization, a 2-party environment):
Suppose Alice and Bob wants to solve the following problem: (20):
where the private variables are x i ∈ IR ni , public variables are y i ∈ IR p , i = 1, 2, and net variable is z ∈ IR p .
For fixed z, problem (25) is decoupled as
where the variable is x i ∈ IR ni (let i = 1 corresponds to Alice and i = 2 corresponds to Bob). By using the usual notation ϕ(y i ) to denote the optimal value of problem above, we can show that
where λ i is an optimal dual variable associated with the first constraint of problem (26) . Thus, Alice makes public h 1 and Bob makes public h 2 and they communicate to perform Algorithm 1. Note that Bob cannot recover the input {A 1 , B 1 , C 1 } of Alice because λ 1 is known by Alice only and h 1 is a transformed variant of C 1 .
Same arguments hold for Alice as well. Thus the solution method yields input privacy for
Moreover, we can easily see that the algorithm yields output privacy for {x 
where the private variables are x i ∈ IR ni and the public variables are y i ∈ IR p , i = 1, . . . , K. In the problem above, we have not explicitly written out the net variables z = (y 1 , . . . , y K ) ∈ IR pK and the constraint
p×p is the identity matrix. This is to avoid unnecessary notations. For fixed
where the variable is x i ∈ IR ni . With usual notations, we obtain the subgradients as follows:
where λ i ∈ IR p is an optimal dual variable associated with the constraint
Thus, each entity makes public its h i and they communicate to perform Algorithm 1. Note that no entity j ̸ = i can recover the input of entity i because λ 1 has no information of {A i , b i , c i }. Here, the step 2 and 3 of Algorithm 1 is simply given by
where I i ∈ IR p×p is the identity matrix and [ y ] + is the projection of y ∈ IR p onto set IR p + , the cone of nonnegative, real p-vectors. We note that solution method yields input privacy for {A i , b i , c i } i=1,...K as required. We also note that the algorithm yields output privacy for the solution of original problem (48) (i.e.,
..K ) and for the optimal value (i.e., p ⋆ ), because none can compute it.
B. Dual Decomposition
Dual decomposition techniques provide another mechanism for solving problems in a parallelized manner. As the name suggests, the machinery behind the dual decomposition is the duality [39, § 5] . They can gracefully handle cases where either the transforation based methods ( § III) or the primal decomposition based methods ( § IV-A) are not applied. In the sequel, we first present concisely the dual decomposition algorithm derivation. Then we discuss the privacy preserving properties of this method followed by some examples.
Here, we use the same problem (20) that we considered in § IV-A. We start by writing the partial Lagrangian of problem (20)
where λ = (λ 1 , . . . , λ K ) ∈ IR p is the Lagrange multiplier associated with y = Ez, and λ i is the part of λ associated with entity i. The dual function is obtained by minimizing L(x, y, z, λ) over (x, y, z). For simplifying the presentation, suppose Z = IR p . Thus, the minimization with respect to z indicates that E T λ = 0 (otherwise, the dual function is unbounded below), which acts as a constraint on dual variables λ. Moreover, because the Lagrangian (34) is decoupled, the minimization with respect to (x, y) can be carried out independently, i.e., each entity performs minimization with respect to (x i , y i ). In particular, entity i solves the problem
where the variable is (x i , y i ). We denote by (x ⋆ i , y ⋆ i ) the solution and by g i (λ i ) the optimal value of problem (35) . Then, the dual problem can be formally expressed as
where the variable is λ. Moreover, we can easily show that −y
at λ. We use projected subgradient method to solve the dual problem (36) . The algorithm is as follows:
Given an initial value of λ such that E T λ = 0. Set iteration index k = 1. repeat 1. Entity i extracts subvector i of λ, i.e., λ i and solves problem (35) . We denote by (x i , y i ) the solution,
2. Update the subgradient −y = −(y 1 , . . . , y K ) .
3. Update the λ as, λ := Π S (λ + α k y), where Π S (·) denotes the projection onto S = {s | E T s = 0}.
Here α k is an appropriate step size. As in the case of primal decomposition algorithm, each step of the above algorithm are performed in a parallelized manner as well. Provided some conditions hold true (e.g., strict convexity of f i , finiteness of f i ), Algorithm 2 converges to an optimal solution and the optimal value of problem (20) . Due to page limitations, we refer the reader to [1] , [32] , [49] for details. Let us now discuss the privacy preserving properties of distributed optimization methods based on dual decomposition.
Privacy Properties
Privacy preserving properties of dual decomposition method are very similar to those of primal decomposition based solution methods. For example, the method yields input privacy for the input
..,K , and output privacy for the output {{x
In particular, no entity i is required to reveal her problem data f i , C i , as well as the current solution x i to any other entity j ̸ = i. In order to perform step 2-3 of the algorithm, entity i should however expose the subgradient y i , which is indeed the global variable solution at the current iteration. These subgradients do not expose the private information {f i , C i } i=1,...,K , and
..,K to each other. As for the primal decomposition method, entity i requires coordinating only with its neighbors, and therefore lesser the information (e.g., subgradient y i ) penetration through the multi-party environment. An example is provided next to highlight these appealing privacy preserving aspects of the dual decomposition method, which is not handled by either the transforation based methods ( § III) or the primal decomposition based methods ( § IV-A).
Example 15 (QP with horizontally partitioned linear constraints, a multi-party environment):
Consider the following problem that is to be solved by K entities:
where the variable is x ∈ IR n . The problem data are c i ∈ IR p , A i ∈ IR q×p , and positive definite matrices B i ∈ IR p×p . Suppose entity i wants input privacy for problem data
..,K . The dual decomposition method gracefully handles the problem. To see this, let us first equivalently reformulate the problem in the form (20) , i.e., minimize
where the variables are z and y i , i = 1, . . . , K. Next, each entity i solves his subproblem (step 1 of Algorithm 2):
where the variable is y i . Only the solution y ⋆ i is made public by entity i. Note that y ⋆ i contain no information about {A i , B i , c i }, the private input of the entity. Then all entities communicate to perform step 2-3 of the algorithm. In particular, step 2-3 can be expressed compactly as
Note that this solution method yields input
..K as required. We also note that the algorithm yields output privacy for p ⋆ , the optimal value, because it is not computable during or after the algorithm terminates.
In addition to the classic methods described above (see § IV), there are other related solution methods as well, e.g., the state-of-the art alternating direction method of multipliers [33] . In the sequel, we discuss basic theoretical backgrounds for these methods together with some examples to show their relevance in the context of privacy preserving optimization.
V. ALTERNATING DIRECTION METHOD OF MULTIPLIERS (ADMM)
As we pointed out in § IV-B, to yield convergence, the dual decomposition method relies on assumptions such as strict convexity of f i s and finiteness of f i s. ADMM provides an elegant way to exclude such assumptions and thus brings robustness to the dual decomposition method, while still preserving the decomposability of problem (20) . Let us next discuss the basic theory behind ADMM. We refer the reader to [33] for details.
The problem formulation is slightly changed, i.e., instead of (general) problem (20), we consider a simple variant that is sufficient to highlight the steps of algorithm development. minimize f 1 (y) + f 2 (z)
where the variables are y ∈ IR n , z ∈ IR p and the problem data is A ∈ IR q×n , B ∈ IR q×p , and c ∈ IR q . Let us now consider a related problem obtained by adding a quadratic penalty term to the objective function of problem (41), i.e., minimize f 1 (y) + f 2 (z) + (ρ/2)||Ay + Bz − c|| Lagrangian of problem (42) as
where λ ∈ IR q is the Lagrange multiplier associated with Ay + Bz = c. The minimization of the Lagrangian is performed in two steps, as opposed to one step in dual approach. In particular,
we have 1) y-minimization, 2) z-minimization. Next, the dual variable update is performed. The algorithm continues in an iterative manner as follows.
problem (20) , all the privacy preserving properties of dual decomposition method are achieved by ADMM as well. For instance, the method yield input privacy for the input {f i ,
and output privacy for the output {{x
Note that the penalty term here would be
which is separable among the entities. As a result, the step 1 of Algorithm 3 (or 4) would be separable and allows each entity i to solve its' subproblems without revealing to any other entity j ̸ = i the problem data f i , C i and the current solution. The coordination in step 2-3 of the algorithm is through the global variables {y i } i=1,...,K , which do not expose the private
It is important to note that there is a number of other interesting problems where transformation ( § III), primal ( § IV-A), and dual ( § IV-B) based methods do not applies, but ADMM method gracefully applied to solve those in a privacy preserving manner (e.g., problems with functions that takes on ∞). In the sequel, we provide some example to give these flavors to the reader. 
where the variable is z ∈ IR n . ADMM method can readily be applied solve this problem in a privacy preserving manner. Consider the equivalent problem minimize f 1 (y) + f 2 (z)
where the variables are y ∈ IR n and z ∈ IR n . Thus, given z and µ, step 1 of Algorithm 4 simply reduces to returning the solution y ⋆ of problem minimize (ρ/2)||y − (z − µ)||
with the variable (z 1 , . . . , z K+1 ). Because we want to see the relation of data decomposition in each problem (50), as well as (51), here we do not attempt to find any closed form solutions to those problems. Finally, step 3 of Algorithm 4, i.e., the (scaled) dual variable update is given by λ
Note that problem (50) [39, § 11] , which can be implemented by using floatingpoint arithmetic and thus they are very effective compared to cryptographic methods. These properties are directly reflected in the case of protocol complexity as well. In terms of scalability, decomposition methods, and ADMM are preferred compared to others. This is because the mechanism associated allows them to coordinate their actions using a thin protocol irrespective of the size of the problem. The poor scalability properties of cryptographic methods is mainly due to their low efficiency and high complexity, especially for relatively large problems. Transformation methods also have scalability issues because a transformed variant of the original problem has to be solved by each party involved. As a result, the computations are restricted by the size of the problem. There are guaranteed privacy properties in cryptographic methods [6] , [34] - [38] . However, in the case of optimization based approaches, there are little investigations for quantifying the privacy. This is still a largely a question mark and an open issue.
In the case of linear programming, cryptographic protocols are often collaboratively executed in each iteration step of the simplex algorithm [5] , [44] . Thus, they are inherently restricted to linear programs. More recently the first cryptographic method for handling interior point method have been proposed in [5] . Still the high computational complexity for cryptographically secured iterations in both the simplex and interior point methods is unavoidable. However, the underlying machinery for interior point methods for optimization based approaches are built on linear algebra, which is very efficiently implemented compared to cryptographic treatments. A basic characteristic of the cryptographic-based methods is that they are carried out over a finite field and thus is constrained to integer domains. In contrast, optimization based approaches are well suited for real vector spaces. Finally, note that the cryptographic methods are not much sensitive to the structural changes of the problem, though the protocol is required to be updated.
However, the decomposition, and ADMM, methods are highly sensitive to the way the data are partitioned among different parties.
All the distributed privacy preserving methods presented (decomposition, ADMM) in the paper solve the problem in an iterative manner (in the original variable domain) compared to cryptographic and transformation based method. Each iteration requires the entities to share some information about its current state. This collecting of data from several iterations might allow an adversary to estimate private data. This situation can appear in any of the distributed methods. We strongly believe that quantifying the security level in these situations as well as in different optimization approaches is still an open question, requiring a careful discussion of the algorithmic properties as well as the problem assumptions.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we presented a framework for a systematic study and classification of distributed optimization solvers that are able to preserve the privacy among parties. A general classification of the privacy preserving methods was presented. We summarized the existing privacy preserving techniques by a more general form and we discussed in detail general decomposition structures in optimization and their privacy preserving properties.
Several challenging issues still arise in this field. First, transformation and decomposition methods provide security guarantees that are not strong, especially when applied in small problems. In these cases the disguise methods that are applied do not have enough inputs (variables and constraints) to securely transform the problem to a new domain. Therefore, more research effort must be placed in establishing new methodologies that could guarantee high security levels even in small scale problems. Second, the efficiency of the transformation and the decomposition methods highly depends on the way data are partitioned among the participants in the optimization. We believe that research is required to define a systematic method to disclose the best partitioning scenario so to reduce the vulnerability of the method. We believe that future parallel and distributed systems that wish to optimally interact while preserving privacy, can gain a significant benefit from the methods we have surveyed. We further believe that the theory of per-se privacy preserving optimization is at a very early stage, an much needs to be investigated.
